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Abstract: Route selection in cognitive packet networks (CPNs) occurs continuously for active flows 
aŶd is dƌiǀeŶ ďǇ the useƌs͛ ĐhoiĐe of a ƋualitǇ of seƌǀiĐe ;QoSͿ goal. BeĐause ƌoutiŶg oĐĐuƌs 
concurrently to packet forwarding, CPN flows are able to better deal with unexpected variations 
in network status, while still achieving the desired QoS. Random neural networks (RNNs) play a 
key role in CPN routing and are responsible to the next-hop decision making of CPN packets. By 
using reinforcement learning, RNNs. weights are continuously updated based on expected QoS 
goals and information that is collected by packets as they travel on the network experiencing the 
current network conditions. CPN.s QoS performance had been extensively investigated for a 
variety of operating conditions. Its dynamic and self-adaptive properties make them suitable for 
withstanding availability attacks, such as those caused by worm propagation and denial-of-service 
attacks. However, security weaknesses related to confidentiality and integrity attacks have not 
been previously examined. Here, we look at related network security threats and propose 
mechanisms that could enhance the resilience of CPN to confidentiality, integrity and availability 
attacks. 
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1  Introduction  
 
Reliable networks that provide good service quality are expected to become the norm in all 
communication aspects, especially as the information transferred between network users gets more 
complex and confidential, and as malicious users try to deliberately degrade or altogether deny 
legitimate network service. There is therefore an increased need for network stability and reliability 
which has led to the growth of autonomic networks that use quality of service (QoS)-driven 
approaches for greater stability and reliability in communications. The cognitive packet network (CPN) 
that was introduced by Gelenbe et al. (1999) has been shown to provide good network adaptation 
properties under varying network conditions and user requirements. Its performance has been 
investigated extensively and for a variety of performance metrics, but most studies have considered 
operating conditions where there is no malicious intent or security threats limited to availability 
attacks through worm propagation or network denial-of-service (Sakellari, 2009). 
In CPN, the steady-state of random neural networks (RNNs) running on network routers decides 
network paths. RNNs (Gelenbe et al., 2001b; Gelenbe and Fourneau, 1999) are trained continuously 
by enhancing network flows with packets that monitor performance. These packets store information 
about the network state as they cross the network from a source to a destination, and get updated at  
 
 
each hop in the path. In general, CPN blindly trusts the information carried by packets, but a network 
attack could result in some routers falling under the control of a malicious user, and as a consequence 
packets may be subject to tampering. The problem is aggravated as routing decisions in CPN are 
distributed. In this paper, we examine potential weaknesses of CPN and the use of RNNs in relation to 
confidentiality, integrity and availability, and identify possible solutions that could enhance the 
resilience of CPN to representative security threats. 
 
 
2  Brief overview of the CPN 
 
 
The CPN is a routing protocol that uses adaptive techniques based on online measurements to provide 
QoS to its users (Gelenbe et al., 2000, 2001a; Sakellari, 2009). The users themselves can declare 
individually their QoS goals, such as minimum delay, minimum packet loss, maximum bandwidth, 
minimum power consumption or a weighted combination of these. CPN has been designed to perform 
self-improvement in a distributed manner by learning from the experience of the packets in the 
network and by constantly probing for the current best routes. 
More specifically, CPN uses three types of packets; smart packets (SPs) for discovery, source 
routed dumb packets (DP) to carry the payload and acknowledgement (ACK) packets to bring back 
information that has been discovered by either SPs or DPs. This information is used in each node to 
train RNNs (Gelenbe et al., 2001b) and produce routing decisions. At each network node, SPs are 
routed according to the measured experiences of previous packets with the same QoS goals and the 
same destination. In order to explore all possible routes and account for sudden network changes, 
each SP might make a random routing decision instead of the one calculated by the RNN, with a small 
probability (usually 5% to 10%). 
The header of the CPN packets has been modified to allow the packets to gather network 
information according to the specified QoS goal. Therefore, as packets travel the network, they store 
QoS data (such as timestamps, counters, etc.) in a special data storage area of the packet header 
known as the cognitive map (CM) (Gellman, 2007). When a packet arrives at its destination, an ACK 
packet is generated which stores the route taken by the original packet, and the measurements it 
collected during its journey. The ACK will then return along the reverse route. At each hop the ACK 
visits, it deposits information in a special short-term memory store called mailbox. When it finally 
reaches the source, the ACK establishes the route that the DPs will follow. 
At each node a specific RNN, that has as many neurons as the possible outgoing links, provides 
the SP with the routing decision in the form of an output link. This output link corresponds to the most 
excited neuron, and since the RNN has a unique solution for any set of weights and input variables, 
this choice is also unique. The learning process used with RNN is reinforcement learning, which uses 
the observed outcome of a decision to reward or punish the routing decision, so that future decisions 
are more likely to improve or maintain the desired QoS goal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3  Identifying and addressing CPN security weaknesses  
 
 
Here, we investigate potential weaknesses of CPN falling under the triad of common security aspects: 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000) and propose possible 
solutions. Public and shared networks offer greater security challenges than private and dedicated 
networks. We will make no assumptions about the type of deployment, so both the discussion and 
results will be applicable to both cases. However, the discussion will be centred only on network 
weaknesses and will exclude particular issues at endpoints. 
 
3.1 Confidentiality 
 
Confidentiality is breached when information, held or transmitted through the network, is disclosed 
to unauthorised individuals or systems. Ensuring total confidentiality in a network is normally very 
difficult given that packets need regular handling by routers that are managed by a third party, and 
outside the sender and recipient͛s domains. In that sense, a CPN is as vulnerable to confidentiality 
attacks as other types of networks. Up to now there has not been any security mechanism in CPN that 
could guarantee a confidential end-to-eŶd deliǀeƌǇ of useƌs͛ data. 
A confidentiality attack could take place either at hijacked routers or links. In the former case, an 
attacker could have gained access to a netǁoƌk Ŷode oŶ the path fƌoŵ the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s flow and forward 
a copy of the traffic content to a collection point. In the latter case, packet sniffers could have been 
installed on a network link to eavesdrop incoming network traffic. An interesting point to note is that 
the self-adapting path behaviour of CPN could partially prevent a confidential attack given that not all 
packets for a given communication may need to pass through the same set of links and nodes unlike 
traditional networks. A path adaptation may deviate packets away from the hijacked routers and links. 
However, there is no way to ensure this will happen given that it will be very difficult to detect the 
packet sniffing process. 
 
Figure 1 End-to-end user data encryption and decryption as an external process 
 
 
The usual solution to ensure network confidentially is to encrypt end-to-end communications, and this 
approach can be applied also to CPN. In the context of a CPN implementation, at least two alternatives 
are possible. Data encryption could occur before data is passed to CPN for transmission and after CPN 
delivers the data (Figure 1, which could be handled either by the application or an intermediate layer 
above TCP/IP, such as the transport layer security (TLS) protocol. A second possibility is that CPN 
encrypts and decrypts user data at a per-packet basis at the edge routers or endpoints (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 Per-packet data encryption by CPN 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Measured transfer time over a CPN path of 5 nodes for files of the indicated length with 
and without encryption (see online version for colours) 
 
 
Figure 3 depicts the transfer time that was measured for files of the indicated length, with or without 
encryption. The source and destination nodes (which implemented the encryption and decryption 
process) run with a clock rate of 2.8 and 2.4 GHz, respectively. The path connecting the source and 
destination was unique to ensure obtaining consistent results for all tests, and it consisted of five hops. 
The encryption was realised via secure sockets (so the programming was external to the CPN module). 
The results indicate that the encryption and decryption process add about one additional second to 
the total end-to-end transfer time. This additional delay to the file transfer is the penalty caused by 
the extra computation that was needed. 
 
3.2 Integrity 
 
Integrity refers to the security requirement for information and systems not to be altered without the 
authorisation of their legitimate owners. As mentioned previously, CPN does not normally encrypt 
packets, but when done as described earlier, it could also help to (at least partially) address integrity 
issues given that aŶǇ alteƌatioŶ of a paĐket͛s payload by an attacker will trigger decryption errors at 
the destination. Unfortunately, not only the useƌs͛ data could be the target of an attacker, but also 
the Ŷodes͛ ideŶtitǇ ;ďǇ ĐhaŶgiŶg values in the packet header) and, in the particular case of CPN, 
network status data and paths (by altering the CM). 
Attacks to the CPN header or CM can directly affect the ability of the CPN algorithm and the RNN 
to effectively respond to network and user behaviour changes, and can also affect the quality of the 
routing decisions. By changing the packet header or CM, which stores real observations of the QoS 
that could be achieved by the network, a malicious user could impact the RNN training process, and 
therefore tweak the routing decisions to cause unexpected behaviour. 
Other ways for this to happen is by changing the actual information that is stored in the 
mailboxes of the nodes, by altering the RNN weights, or even by replacing the RNN-based algorithm 
with an arbitrary one. Attackers could gain control of one or more nodes in the network and easily 
change the RNN algorithm behaviour, either directly or indirectly through manipulation of the mailbox 
entries. To illustrate the problem, consider a communication flow from nodes A to B as depicted in 
Figure 4. A normal communication flow will include packets listing in their CM the path A, C, B (step 
1). If node C becomes under the control of an attacker, it could rewrite the CM of the packets and 
forward them to an arbitrary node D (step 2). The purpose could be either to gain access to the 
paĐkets͛ ĐoŶteŶts oƌ to siŵplǇ affeĐt the quality-of-service of packets (e.g., increase their end-to-end 
latency). After being intercepted by node D, the packets could continue their normal path (step 3). As 
usual, the destination will create ACKs and sent them on the reverse path (step 4) until they reach the 
attaĐkeƌ͛s nodes D and C (step 5). Node C could then rewrite the CM back to the original (step 6) to 
conceal the attack from the source. Several variations of this kind of attack could occur, for example, 
rather than forwarding packets to node D, node C could simply write untrue values in the CM metrics 
perhaps to indicate better QoS metrics on paths passing through C so that packets become easily 
available to the attacker. The key CPN weakness in these cases is in having absolute trust in the 
distributed CM handling. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Example of CM integrity attack 
 
 
 
 
 
To prevent such kinds of integrity attacks to the CPN header and CM, we propose introducing digital 
signatures both at the source (for normal packets) and destination (for ACKs). Asymmetric 
cryptography is a suitable alternative for this task given that it removes the need of secret key 
distribution. Under this scheme, CPN routers will be required to have both a private and public key. 
We suggest two possible implementation approaches. In the first case, we differentiate core 
routers from edge routers (those connected to the end users), with edge routers signing and verifying 
signatures for each flow. In a second case, all routers will participate in the signature verification 
process. The advantage of the former case is speed whereas the second provides greater resilience, 
as attacked packet could be removed earlier from the network. Another difference between the two 
is the method of distribution of the public key. In the first case, only edges will be required to know 
the public key of edge routers. In the latter case, all routers will have to have access to those keys. 
The signature generation and verification process is depicted in Figure 5. The source (end-node or 
edge router) will generate a message digest of the CPN normal (dumb) packet header and partial CM 
(including entries that are not expected to change). The message digest will be then encrypted using 
the souƌĐe͛s private key and inserted into the extended CPN header. The extended packet is then sent 
over the CPN using its regular packet forwarding mechanism. At the receiving end (or intermediate 
hop, depending on the scheme being used), the signature will be regenerated from the receiving 
header and CM, and compared with the signature in the packet. If they do not match, something in 
the header of the CM must have changed on the way, thus indicating the packet has been tampered 
and should be discarded. 
The signature generation and verification will add additional delay to a normal end-to-end packet 
transmission. Measurements of these additional delays are depicted in Figure 6 for packets of 
different length. We have observed that signature generation took around 6.5 ms, signature 
verification was faster at 3.6 ms, and that the packet length has little impact on the execution time of 
the processes. The measurements were obtained on a 2.8 GHz machine. 
Figure 5 Digital signature generation and verification for the CPN header and CM 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Measured signature creation and verification times for packets of different lengths 
(see online version for colours) 
 
 
 
3.3 Availability 
 
Availability refers to the security requirement for information and network services to be available to 
their legitimate users, and may be affected if intermediate routers behave erratically (the case of 
hijaĐked Ŷodes ƌuŶŶiŶg attaĐkeƌ͛s softǁaƌeͿ oƌ stop ǁoƌkiŶg, possibly due to a denial of service attack. 
Availability in CPN has been investigated previously in terms of the propagation of worms that disable 
nodes (Sakellari, 2011), denial of service attacks (Gelenbe et al., 2004) and misbehaving routers (Lent 
and Gelenbe, 2012). Interestingly, as we will see, the self-adapting behaviour that is natural in CPN 
constitutes and inherent strength of the algorithm against all these threats. 
 
3.3.1 Misbehaving routers 
 
The case of hijacked routers exhibiting an erratic behaviour has been recently studied (Lent and 
Gelenbe, 2012). However, this work did not introduce specific mechanisms to deal with router 
misbehaviour. Two types of router misbehaviour were addressed: routers that drop a percentage of 
incoming packets and routers the direct SP to the worst possible next hop decision (according to the 
RNN algorithm). 
Given that the reinforcement learning algorithm used in the RNN evaluates cumulative next hop 
behaviour, both types of misbehaviours can be addressed by introducing packet loss metrics in the 
formulation of routing goals as done in Gelenbe et al. (2002) for normal packet drops. In particular, 
assuming a generic hop cost C and estimations of the packet loss ratio L, the goal function for RNN 
training could be expressed as: 
 
       L 
G=          P+C 
     1 - L 
 
where P is an arbitrary penalty that is usually fixed to higher value than the cost of any path.  
To experimentally evaluate this case, we have deployed a CPN testbed and conducted a number 
of trials and observations assuming that some of the core routers were compromised by an attacker, 
and therefore, had an abnormal behaviour. 
A CPN implementation for the networking stack of the Linux kernel was used to carry out our tests. 
The implementation followed the algorithm described in Gelenbe (2004). The CPN implementation 
was deployed on 33 virtual machines, which were hosted by 6 quad-core physical machines using the 
VirtualBox hypervisor. These virtual machines allowed us to create a virtual topology, which was 
modelled after a real world topology (ATT network). The exact technique that was employed to 
implement the virtual network can be found in the literature (Lent and Gelenbe, 2012). Each of the 
virtual machines consisted of a single core CPU with 256 KB of RAM and served to implement a 
software Linux router running the CPN module. The original ATT network topology that was available 
as a model for our virtual topology consisted of 27 nodes. However, six additional nodes were added 
to have extra communication endpoints, making a total of 33 nodes (and 50 links), of which 8 nodes 
had a single connection to the network and were used as endpoints for test traffic flows. While any 
network node could be attacked in a real network, we limited the simulated attacks to any of the 25 
core routers given the scope of our study. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 A CPN testbed of virtual routers 
 
 
 
 
Note: A double circle indicates the source or sink of a test traffic. 
 
At each endpoint, a traffic generator was installed to create UDP tƌaffiĐ at a fiǆed ƌate λ with a given 
packet size L and directed to another random endpoint, for a time period T. Rate λ was randomly 
selected in the range 100.3,000 Bps. Similarly, each flow duration T was randomly assigned in the 
range from 1 to 3 minutes. Packets were assumed to be small (4B). The traffic generator created flows 
one after another so as to achieve an uninterrupted emission of packets from each endpoint during 
any experiment. 
SPs were sent as a 0.1 fraction of normal packets to maintain path adaptation if needed in the 
case of a change in network conditions. At each hop, SP used a RNN to decide the next hop except for 
10% of the decisions, which used a random neighbour selection that helped to facilitate network 
exploration and the discovery of alternative paths to destinations. Because of the use of virtualised 
resources in our tests, we opted for introducing SP routing based on router costs, which were 
randomly selected at the beginning of the experiment, in the range 1.100. For any given source 
destination pair, SPs had in general the task of finding the path with the minimum cost (the sum of 
the router costs involved in a path) or, if requested, the path with the minimum combination of cost 
and packet loss. The penalty value P was fixed to 100 units. 
Hijacked routers behaved maliciously by directing SPs to the worst possible next hop as an attempt 
to increase the end-to-end flow cost or to prevent route discovery. Because CPN can easily isolate 
those routers, the difference of using the aforementioned goal functions to train the RNN was very 
small. Nevertheless, we did observe slightly higher loss (10.4) ratio when only cost was used. 
During the experiments, a number of core routers were assumed to be under the control of an 
attacker. Routers will drop a percentage of all the incoming normal traffic. Figure 8 depicts the 
measured ratio between the packet delivery rates for the case when the RNNs were trained using a 
cost-packet loss goal vs. the case of RNNs only trained with a cost-based goal. It can be observed that 
as the number of hijacked routers increased, the comparative advantage of using a combined cost-
loss goal diminished from about 20% to 5%. 
Figure 8 Packet delivery improvement ratio of the RNN when trained with both cost and loss compared to only 
using cost (see online version for colours) 
 
 
 
3.3.2 Existing work on resilience of CPN to worms 
 
Although CPN is generally very resilient to network changes, it was shown in Sakellari (2011), Sakellari 
and Gelenbe (2009, 2010), and Gelenbe (2009) that it suffered worse performance during node 
failures, as the loss of ACK packets led to insufficient training of the RNNs, the weights of which in a 
node are updated only when an ACK packet returns to it. For that reason, CPN nodes route a fraction 
of the SPs randomly, so that sudden changes of any kind could be discovered, but still in some 
scenarios it may need considerable numbers of random SPs before the decision of a node changes. 
The authors of Sakellari (2011), and Sakellari and Gelenbe (2009, 2010) investigated the performance 
of CPN during a worm propagation which resulted in network failures. The worm was spreading 
according to the analytical active worm propagation (AAWP) epidemiological model, a discrete-time 
and continuous state deterministic approximation model of the spread of active worms that scan for 
targets randomly (Chen et al., 2003). 
A failure detection element was proposed to improve the performance of CPN in terms of packet 
delays and packet loss during failures. With this enhancement, at each RNN and for each neuron i, the 
timestamp of the last SP and the last ACK that used it, are stored. If no ACK has been received after 
sendiŶg the last SP theŶ the liŶk is ĐoŶsideƌed ͚uŶdeƌ failuƌe͛ and the neuron corresponding to this link 
is ĐoŶsideƌed ͚eǆpiƌed͛. Expired neurons do not participate in the calculation of the excitatory 
probabilities and the subsequent decisions of the RNN. The enhanced CPN was also compared with 
the open shortest path first (OSPF) routing protocol and was shown to perform better in such 
situations. 
3.3.3 Resilience to denial-of-service attacks 
 
Most protection systems for DoS attacks rely on hardware or software components that are added on 
top of an existing information and communication infrastructure (Loukas and Oke, 2010). Examples 
have been developed by Gelenbe et al. to achieve detection and response against such attacks. The 
first mathematical model for the analysis of the impact of flood-based DoS attacks was introduced in 
Gelenbe et al. (2004) and insights based on its numerical results led to the development of prototype 
defence implementations (Gelenbe et al., 2005). These involved mechanisms for the selective 
dropping of packets based on their probability of being illegitimate, and were developed as modules 
of the CPN kernel. However, a significant weakness of defence mechanisms that are based on packet 
dropping is the substantial loss of valid packets due to false positives. 
In Gelenbe and Loukas (2007), CPN.s defence framework was improved with the introduction of 
a rate-limiting and prioritisation mechanism, where the result of validity tests against individual data 
packets determined the priority by which they would be served by the nodes. In recognition of the 
imperfection of any detection mechanism, by reducing the priority rather than dropping the packets 
that were detected to be malicious, false positives were reduced and the legitimate traffic served in 
the network was increased considerably. 
 
Figure 9 Packet loss during a DoS attack for static and CPN dynamic routing, (a) without DoS defence and (b) 
with an imperfect defence system 
 
 
(a)                                                                                                (b) 
 
Source: Figure from Loukas (2006) 
 
Regardless of the specifics of the implementation of the response mechanism, the performance of a 
denial-of-service defence system is always highly dependent on the precision of detection. The 
detection approach presented in Oke and Loukas (2007) was based on the maximum likelihood 
principle and data fusion using the RNN, in both feedforward and recurrent architectures. The input 
features used were the instantaneous bitrate and its rate of increase, the delay and its rate of increase, 
the entropy of the incoming traffic, as well as its Hurst parameter (Loukas and Oke, 2007). In Oke and 
Loukas (2008), emphasis was placed on the distributed aspects of effective response. 
 
In all these defence approaches, various forms of CPN were used as the underlying network 
infrastructure. We argue that the choice of the RNN-based CPN as the routing paradigm plays by itself 
a noticeable role in terms of the network͛s inherent resilience to flood-based availability attacks. 
Experiments presented in Loukas (2006) have indicated that CPN͛s dynamic routing improves 
considerably the performance of an imperfect DoS defence system during attacks of low to medium 
intensity (Figure 9; Pf and Pd are the assumed defence system͛s probabilities of false positive and 
correct detection). 
 
4  Conclusions  
 
The inherent self-adaptive properties of the CPN constitute a significant advantage for helping it 
withstand attacks against its availability. Its self-adaptation becomes even more effective after 
introducing packet losses into the goal formulation for training the distributed RNNs that are used in 
the routing algorithm. A denial of service defence mechanism with a given set of detection 
probabilities becomes more effective if applied in conjunction with the dynamic routing of CPN. Yet, 
similarly to the internet protocol, CPN was designed based on trust. By trusting the information carried 
by packets and that no node could be compromised, CPN becomes vulnerable to confidentiality and 
integrity attacks. It offers, by default, little support to ensure end-to-end confidential delivery of data 
or integrity of packets, which is of crucial importance given that it relies on real-time packets͛ 
information to effectively setup and maintain paths. Here, we have proposed extensions to the CPN 
protocol to explicitly address these weaknesses via the introduction of encryption and digital 
signatures. We have detailed the technical implementation of these mechanisms and argued that the 
benefits from strengthening the confidentiality and integrity, along with the availability of information 
transmitted through CPN, outweigh the disadvantage of the associated delays that are incurred. 
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